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Water-Microcredit Models and Market Inclusion: Shifting Debts and 
Responsibility 
Catherine Baron, Joshua Greene, Philip Mader and Solène Morvant-Roux 
 
Summary 
This paper examines and problematises ongoing changes in the relationship between 
citizens, markets and states around access to key public services. We document the 
promotion and emergence, over roughly the last ten years, of microcredit services to 
leverage household access to drinking water. We argue that water-microcredit 
arrangements imbricate with highly problematic elements of contemporary market-
oriented inclusive development, which raise vexing questions about rights and equity. 
Water-microcredit arrangements require poor and low-income people to use loans to 
buy access to water services or construct their own supply. To be served, they must 
adopt an entrepreneurial form of agency, embrace debt, and cultivate self-
responsibility, or otherwise risk being excluded and/or subjected to behaviour-change 
initiatives. We find that therefore the ‘inclusion’ promised by ‘inclusive markets’-based 
approaches to water, in particular water-microcredit arrangements, is at best 
conditional, while also being highly differentiating and unequalising. Despite their 
promise to tackle iniquities, water-microcredit arrangements threaten to deepen the 
marketisation and depoliticisation of the water access question, exacerbate 
inequalities, and effectively undermine rights-based approaches. 
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Introduction 
In the post-Washington consensus ideological vacuum, ‘the market’ serves as a central yet 
amorphous and contested reference point for development policy. Policymakers across the 
development space, even the mainstream, have come to regard markets – once seen as 
self-regulating, spontaneous, and naturally inclusive and expansive – as in need of better 
management; even more so since the great financial crisis in 2007–08. Markets’ tendencies 
toward fragility and instability (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2009; Birdsall and Fukuyama 
2011), their non-emergence in response to certain crucial needs (cf. ‘missing markets’; 
Emran et al. 2011: 2) and patterns of exclusion and harm towards marginal people (Karnani 
2008) are finally attracting more attention. The recognition of these problems, however, has 
by no means entailed a clear shift away from market-based (or market-oriented) 
interventions. Rather, a policy shift accompanied by a new type of behaviourism has been 
taking place since at least the mid-2000s, directing attention away from the failure of markets 
themselves and toward the supposed failure of individuals in relation to markets (World Bank 
2014). 
 
Microfinance has been one of the quintessential ‘market-based’ approaches to poverty 
alleviation and development, and water is one of the areas of development in which market 
provision has created the greatest controversy. In this paper, we connect microcredit and 
water with emergent policy approaches around ‘inclusive’ markets that seek to generate 
market inclusion by ensuring a better performance of people for markets. Compared with 
previous market-led initiatives, in which individuals were generally viewed as passive victims 
of market failures, new approaches seek to bring poor (or low-income) people into markets 
by, first, recognising that these people have ‘special’ needs, and second, intervening to make 
them perform in ways that will make them more likely to be served. This approach is both 
‘pro-market’, in that it strives for market-oriented solutions, and ‘post-market’, in that it 
recognises how, ‘more often than not, markets are not enough in and of themselves and 
there is always room to design and implement ‘incentive-compatible’ mechanisms’ (Klein 
2017: 488). Often this is done by actors that wield the power of the state.  
 
According to the United Nations (World Health Organization 2017), in 2015, about 2.3 billion 
people have no access to improved sanitation facilities and around 892 million people still 
practice open defecation, which has a negative impact on the quality of water sources used 
for daily needs. The main international organisations have continually put improved access to 
water and sanitation at the top of the development agenda (UN Millennium Development 
Goals) and recognised clean water and sanitation as a human right (Sultana and Loftus 
2011). But shortages of sources of finance remain a key important obstacle for widening 
coverage for poor populations worldwide. Already in the 1980s, ‘a review by the World Health 
Organization of the International Decade of Drinking Water and Sanitation Water and 
Sanitation (1980s) stated that financial constraints were the single most serious obstacle to 
the progress of the Decade’s goals’ (Littlefair 1998: 7). 
 
Water-microcredit arrangements, wherein small loans to households are used to finance 
water access, falsely make inclusive water access appear no longer a question of correct 
policies, systems, or engineering solutions, but rather, we argue, of financial and 
behaviourally re-engineering water consumers. Instead of addressing thorny questions 
around water equity and rights, or how to make established modes of water provision and 
governance more inclusive (especially the publicly-managed piped systems that resolved 
water poverty issues many decades ago in developed countries; Hall and Lobina 2006), 
water-microcredit arrangements rearrange the discourse and practice of water provision in a 
post-market logic. Their aim is to facilitate low-income people’s self-inclusion via financial 
models that require them to think and act entrepreneurially (as investors in their own water 
inclusion), and to accept modes of provision that often entail lower quality services at a 
 7 
 
higher price. They often entail alternative systems of provision, off-grid solutions, and 
inequitable ways of buying into existing piped networks. We highlight the extra conditions 
that low-income individuals are expected to meet in order to have access to marketised safe 
drinking water, and argue that the insertion of financial and behavioural technologies into 
household water provision is a significant and potentially worrying development. It serves to 
rejuvenate market-like (or market-compatible) models of provision where market-based 
approaches previously demonstrably failed to deliver and public sector-led approaches are 
gradually gaining ground again (McDonald 2014).  
 
We proceed as follows: the next section studies the enmeshment of personal financial 
services with water access by tracing the confluence of changes in water policy since the 
1980s with the rise of microfinance and reviewing two particular water-microcredit models. 
The third section identifies the key ideological and practical ingredients of this enmeshment 
of financial services with water provision: markets at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ and ‘social 
business’; inclusive markets and inclusive capitalism; entrepreneurial conceptions of human 
agency; and behaviour-change programming focused on individual responsibilisation. In 
section four, we discuss the wider implications of water-microcredit models for water 
provision and inclusive development, noting that inclusion increasingly comes premised on 
conditionality, differentiation and segmentation of users and waters, and individual 
responsibility and behavioural fixes. We conclude with a brief discussion of the ramifications 
for citizenship and equity. 
 
 
1 The convergence of household water and 
microfinance 
Water-microcredit arrangements emerged from a convergence of different trajectories in 
water policy and financial services between the 1980s and 2000s, which we trace here. Both 
sit in the broader context of neoliberal1 development, but are far from coterminous with it; 
they have not emerged seamlessly nor automatically from it, but grown from the 
experimentation and agency of actors both within and outside the neoliberal development 
mainstream.  
 
1.1 Shifts in water policy from public provision to an uncertain mix   
Prior to the mainstreaming of neoliberal approaches to development in the 1980s and 1990s, 
water was almost universally thought of as a state responsibility. While a range of private and 
public actors were involved in activities linked to water provision, including in its treatment, 
infrastructure construction, billing and collections, and financing, crucially, they remained 
under the oversight and direction of the state, and private actors were by-and-large involved 
but for the grace of the state. These broad parameters remained largely uncontested during 
the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade from 1981 to 1990, even as 
in the mid-1980s the focus of policy increasingly shifted toward creation of more 
decentralised, regional water governance systems. These were seen as more efficient and 
accountable than those managed by central government. Local management of water was 
seen as ideal for governance purposes, but the importance of centrally raising finance and 
assembling adequate expertise was recognised, and therefore ‘system extension or 
expansion’ remained to be ‘initiated by the national water institutions’ even if run locally or 
regionally (Eaton 1985: 11; see IDS Bulletin edited by Nicol et al. 2012, which clearly lays out 
these shifts).  
 
                                                 
1  We understand neoliberalism, following Harvey (2005: 2), as a creed: ‘a theory of political economic practices’ focused 
on ‘individual entrepreneurial freedoms’. 
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The International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin, Ireland, held in 1992, 
is widely recognised as demarcating a decisive shift in policy toward markets and the private 
sector’s involvement in water (Camdessus and Winpenny 2003). The Conference officially 
recorded the failure of the prior Water Decade, and set out four principles, with the fourth 
declaring that ‘[w]ater has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be 
recognized as an economic good’ (World Meteorological Organization 1992).2 This fourth 
‘Dublin Principle’ was widely taken to entail that, since the provision of water has a cost, ‘cost 
recovery’ principles ought to be applied, to prevent wasteful consumption (Koudstaal et al. 
1992). With water thus politically constructed as a scarce resource with competing uses, 
scarcity management moved into the foreground (Mehta 2005). By treating water provision 
as a private service and citizens as consumers, following economic theory, pricing 
mechanisms would lead to efficient water allocation as ‘the market system encourages water 
to be allocated with greater preference to its most valued uses’ (Gupta 1992).  
 
One of the most obvious reforms following Dublin was to introduce more widespread 
metering of water connections, often linked with more modern technologies to facilitate pre-
payment or pay-as-you-go systems (Marvin et al. 2001). The argument for optimising and 
maximising economic benefit through pricing water depends on the ability to charge users for 
using certain volumes of water. This is key to ‘financial cost recovery’ on water investments 
which, the World Bank has argued, ‘is critical for the supply of good services’ (World Bank 
2004: 23).  
 
The 1990s also witnessed a spread of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in water (Ménard 
2013), as well as a shift away from supply-oriented policies (focused on expanding the 
supply of water) and toward policies focused on mobilising payments (demand) for water 
provision. The state became a facilitator of privatisation, with many governments 
‘transforming their roles from providers to facilitators of water and sanitation services’ (Traoré 
1992). Private sector actors’ greater access to capital and expertise was expected to more 
effectively reach underserved communities (Tara 2013). But the era of great enthusiasm for 
water PPPs ended in the 2000s, as they encountered multiple challenges. Firstly, their 
efficiency came into question, as they often failed to invest the promised funds in aging 
centralised water systems, or to meet their contractual targets for coverage, particularly in 
rapidly urbanising contexts (Marin 2009). Second, PPPs were found to exacerbate 
inequalities, as water tariffs rose and low-income people were often further excluded (Bakker 
2010). Third, politically charged uprisings and protests in a number of countries explicitly 
challenged water privatisation and PPPs (Larson 2013; Schnitzler 2008).  
 
Even after water multinationals started withdrawing from developing countries, often due to 
their own disappointing financial returns, the World Bank and other donors remained 
reluctant to support provision by public utilities (World Health Organization 2017). Reluctantly 
acknowledging the political sensitivity of water privatisation, proponents of privatisation 
conceded it was necessary to pay ‘much greater attention to the political economy of moving 
from here to there’ (World Bank 2004: 15). Thus, efforts have increasingly turned toward 
leaving public ownership formally intact, while creating parallel market-like structures, in a 
process of ‘creeping privatization’ (Fritz 2006, cited in Mader 2015: 130). But with both the 
state and the private sector’s partial withdrawal from networked household water provision, 
for many people the need for safe drinking water and sanitation remains unmet. 2.1 billion 
people, or almost twice as many people as at the start of campaigns for universal access in 
the 1980s, suffer from a lack access to safe drinking water (World Health Organization 
2017).  
 
                                                 
2  The other three principles recognised water’s finiteness, the need for multiple governance levels, and the importance of 
women in water management.  
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1.2 Experimentation, segmentation, self-help and desperation 
The unresolved legacy of public provision, private investment, and PPPs, has left the access-
to-water space without a dominant intervention, or a dominant provision paradigm. 
Household water provision is potentially open to experimentation and innovation, at the same 
time as many users find themselves dependent on self-help and options of last resort.  
 
On the ground, the experiments, coping strategies of individuals, and self-help approaches of 
local communities have been diverse, and have benefited different (and sometimes 
unexpected) actors. What emerges is a multiplicity of segmented water markets, segmented 
by consumers’ different abilities to buy. Different providers, ranging from large formal 
companies to very small and informal providers, offer different waters at various levels of 
service, reflecting variations of professionalisation, water treatment, quality assurance, and 
ultimately different (perceived and actual) quality and safety of the product. Cheaper water 
(for instance from small vendors or unreliable tap sources) is not necessarily lower quality 
than more expensive water, but buyers can be less certain of its quality. 
 
In rural areas, generally self-supply from wells or surface water sources prevails, but 
particularly in urban and peri-urban contexts where no actor provides piped drinking water 
free from contamination, the segmentation and segregation of supply systems along 
socioeconomic lines is evident. In some cases, multinational corporations (MNCs), selling 
water in bottles have filled part of the gap (Greene 2018). The World Health Organization 
(2017) finds bottled water providers supplying drinking water for at least 20 per cent of the 
populations in a sample of 15 countries; in seven of these countries, more than half of the 
population relies on bottled water. Transnational corporations usually control the upper 
segments of markets, while a variety of small water providers compete for selling water to the 
working poor majorities at significantly lower prices than corporate players, but still much 
higher prices than those which private water management firms as network operators 
charged under PPP arrangements (Montero 2015; Foshee et al. 2009). The segment of 
small private operators forms a heterogeneous, spontaneous alternative to the absent, 
dysfunctional or inaccessible centralised networks in many areas, and include resellers of 
piped water, small-scale purified water sellers, and even some service providers that self-
finance small local water supply networks.   
 
This situation reflects, paradoxically perhaps, not so much the intentions of the 1992 Dublin 
Principles, but nonetheless is a direct consequence. Water’s treatment as an economic good 
has found expression in a segmented market – or more precisely, a set of segmented 
market-like relations and arrangements – for household water. A diverse product range is on 
sale, from different, competing providers; different waters target at different user and usage 
segments. But treating water as an economic good has hardly led to greater equity in 
access. Instead, the emergent solutions have engendered often staggering new inequalities, 
where some consumers can afford to enjoy high-quality convenient water services while the 
poorest water users are left carrying heavy containers of questionably-treated water that is 
still far from cheap. The fundamental shortage of finance for high-quality mass delivery 
infrastructures remains unchanged.  
 
In this context, microloans have increasingly entered the water space as a proposed (but 
problematic) facilitator of household-driven investments. Proponents hope microfinance will 
help address the supply issues by turning households’ water needs into financially 
denominated demand, which suppliers will want to meet. 
 
1.3 The rise of microfinance and the creditworthy poor  
Contemporary microcredit emerged out of experimentation, mainly by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), in the 1970s. It garnered recognition from international financial 
institutions in the 1980s, most importantly with the World Bank integrating it into its structural 
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adjustment programmes (SAPs) to support economic and financial liberalisation by offering 
credit for microenterprise as an alternative to social safety nets and formal employment 
(Weber 2002). Thanks to efforts since the 1980s to commercialise microfinance institutions 
(MFIs), championed by the World Bank and reciprocated by other major donors, as well as 
copious subsidies and grants, microfinance expanded rapidly throughout the 1990s and 
2000s (Mader 2015: 49–61).  
 
Microfinance services have reached almost 200 million families worldwide (Maes and Reed 
2012) and garnered widespread support from key actors in the development space as well 
as the general public, by promising a dynamic and cost-efficient way of engaging with low-
income people. While early microcredit schemes aimed at financing microenterprises only, 
policymakers have increasingly come to treat financial services as multifunctional tools to 
address various problems inherent in poverty, above all households’ low ability to spend on 
consumption and household social reproduction. The suggestion is that access to financial 
services allows low-income people to create, own and accumulate assets, cover shortfalls in 
the areas of consumer expenditure, meet housing expenses, and smooth their consumption 
over time (Collins et al. 2009).  
 
The expectation of financial services to serve as consumption-enabling and reproduction-
enabling tools has broadened the scope, while amplifying what is expected from both low-
income people and their financial service providers. Where microenterprise lending already 
handed the responsibility for development to low-income individuals (to self-develop, by 
investing in enterprise), contemporary financial inclusion discourse expects them to be 
shrewd financial managers, who identify and seize opportunities via financial tools, with an 
entrepreneurial disposition applied to all spheres of life. At the same time, financial service 
providers are expected to accommodate much broader uses of finance by their borrowers; 
for instance, credit to purchase household goods or cover medical expenses. More pointedly, 
increasingly integrate and bundle financial services with the sale of particular goods and 
services. Much attention has therefore turned to the potential for particular small, capital-
intensive, infrastructure-related household investments (such as off-grid home solar units, 
mobile phones, or individual water filters) to be linked with credit. Microcredit is increasingly 
seen by private corporations as a key success factor for making such small investments 
affordable to low-income segments (Devaux 2014). 
 
1.4 From access to finance and water, to household financial services for water 
The increasingly explicit linking of financial services with goods and services with broader 
social significance, or which are essential for household reproduction, not only matches the 
profit imperative of commercial MFIs that seek new outlets for credit. It also aligns with the 
vision espoused by the sector’s guru, Muhammad Yunus, that ‘government, as we now know 
it, should pull out of most things except for law enforcement, the justice system, national 
defense, and foreign policy, and let the private sector, a “Grameenised private sector”, a 
social-consciousness-driven private sector, take over its other functions’ (Yunus 2003: 204). 
Yunus has even argued that ‘credit is a human right’ (Yunus 1997: 1), very much like the 
human right to water.3 
 
The marketisation trend in water since the early 1990s has gradually intermeshed with the 
expansion of commercial microcredit since the mid-1980s. Earliest suggestions that 
microcredit had a role in water provision date back to a study for USAID in 1995, which 
lauded the successes of MFIs at cost recovery, which for most water providers remained 
elusive (Varley 1995). The subsequent connection of household water with microcredit 
proceeded with different models and approaches being trialled, expanded, continued, and 
                                                 
3  Notwithstanding the fact that universal credit access could never really be fulfilled as a right (Hudon 2009). 
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often again lost in obscurity, in a number of countries (for a review of early models, see 
Mader 2015: 217–24).  
 
Erstwhile predictions that the connection with microcredit would bring a rapid breakthrough in 
water – for instance, a prediction of US$12 billion water loans, serving 125 million 
households worldwide, by 2015, by a Gates Foundation report (Mehta 2008) – have not 
come true. However, in recent years, activities have indeed accelerated, above all with NGO 
activity in projects funded by major philanthropic donors and development agencies, with 
many rolled out ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BoP) business models where microcredit programs 
link up with other companies to sell water services, such as individual connections, deep 
tube wells, individual filters, chlorine tablets. The World Bank has supported water-
microfinance arrangements in recent years in Bangladesh, Indonesia and Kenya, and has 
pinpointed ‘water-related microfinance’ as ‘a growing opportunity’ for financing option for the 
2030 Sustainable Development Goals’ agenda (Kolker et al. 2016: 9). The greatest impetus, 
however, has come from philanthrocapitalist bodies such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the Michael and Susan Dell Foundation, and corporate donors such as the IKEA 
and Caterpillar foundations, throwing their financial weight behind NGO-delivered 
interventions. In particular the WaterCredit programme orchestrated by the US-based NGO 
Water.org has benefited, among other things, from the PepsiCo Foundation’s largest-ever 
donation (US$8 million in 2011).  
 
Water-microcredit arrangements are not a single model, but a set of context-specific 
experimentations with similar ingredients. While water and microfinance could theoretically 
be combined in many different ways, including to finance local SME water supply businesses 
(Mehta 2008), the vastly dominant water-microcredit activity has been retail lending to 
households for water (Mader 2011). Such lending to households for water generally takes 
two forms: (1) microloans extended to households to pre-pay for constructing their own water 
access points, usually by NGOs or MFIs: (2) credit extended directly from water supply 
companies, for households to post-pay their connection and consumption of water, as in a 
hire-purchase scheme. We discuss a prominent example of each type here. 
 
1.4.1 WaterCredit pre-payment loans 
The first type of model is exemplified by WaterCredit, a model promulgated by the Kansas 
City-based NGO Water.org. As of 2017, Water.org reported having reached more than 7 million 
people with 1.6 million WaterCredit loans through 72 ‘partners’ (NGOs and MFIs) in 14 
countries.4 The promoter Water.org is funded by donations and grants from foundation, and 
acts in the first instance as a grant-maker to numerous ‘partner’ financial institutions in 
developing countries. These partners use the grants to establish water and sanitation lending 
programmes as part of their offer of services to clients.  
 
Water.org’s manuals urge financial institutions to recognise WASH financing as an 
interesting new area of business, and advise them on product development and marketing of 
tailored financial products. The specific water solutions its Water.org’s resource manuals 
outline are household tap connections (to connect to existing piped water systems), on-site 
household storage tanks for water, private wells/boreholes, and on-site water filtration 
systems (Water.org 2013: 54–57). Water.org advises for loans of around US$30–70 to be 
made for filter systems, US$60–400 for tap connections and storage tanks, and up to 
US$3,000 for borewells (depending on depth and the technology used). Loan periods should 
range between 12 and 36 months, at interest rates between 18 and 20 per cent per annum. 
The role of credit in each of Water.org’s delivery models is to pre-finance the individual 
household’s investment in improved water access. Notably, in the case of filters, tap 
connections, and storage tanks, the investment presupposes an existing water source that 
                                                 
4  https://water.org/our-impact, as of 15 November 2017. 
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the household can gain access to, indicating that much of WaterCredit requires third parties 
(which in most cases will be government) to provide infrastructure.   
 
Given a dearth of existing research,5 very little is known about the practical workings and 
impacts of WaterCredit activities. For WaterCredit-type models more broadly, however, it has 
already been found that the programme’s success hinges on households recognising the 
benefits of investing and – in entrepreneurial fashion – taking out a loan in anticipation of 
financial rewards, which should facilitate loan repayment. Positive impacts from improved 
water in terms of better health, women’s empowerment, comfort, and privacy are expected to 
translate into financial gains, which facilitate repayment of the loan and well as payments to 
other service providers, such as the water supplier and construction company (Mader 2011). 
But, in these types of programmes, difficulties are liable to arise when households are unable 
to make sufficient monetary gains within the loan period, sometimes simply due to 
construction delays, but also more problematically due to the health impacts not occurring or 
accruing too slowly, or not being easily monetisable. Some households may not recognise 
the product as a desirable or affordable choice, leading to low uptake. The resultant risk is 
that only a relatively small number of households participate, and only small individual and 
public health benefits accrue, rendering each individual household’s return-on-investment 
small or negative (Mader 2011: 30–32).  
 
A case study by Humberg (2011) on the Veolia-Grameen programme in Bangladesh found a 
much lower uptake than expected, because the arsenic contamination of local water 
resources was not obvious, and the health effects would only accrue in the long term. The 
benefits of paying higher prices for safe water in return for lower future health costs were 
difficult for the populations to understand; as a result, despite widespread training sessions 
and efforts to inform households, only 13 per cent of the target population was reached. As 
another study of household water filters rolled out on credit via women’s Self-Help Groups in 
India found, health impacts across the population were low because of poor uptake. The 
most vulnerable households were not reached, and widespread incorrect usage rendered the 
filters ineffective (Freeman et al. 2012). Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, Water.org’s 
manuals have lately more strongly emphasised marketing and roll-out strategies based on 
‘behavior change communication’ than household finance; moreover, Water.org has sought 
to link its partners’ microfinance marketing with community-led total sanitation (CLTS) 
programming performed by third parties in India (Water.org 2014: 7–10).   
 
1.4.2 Véolia-Amendis social connections 
In Morocco, the French multinational Véolia was legally required by the government to 
implement social connections in two main towns, Tangier and Tétouan, where it had privately 
acquired the water supply concession. Most local residents already had access to (non-free 
but safe) drinking water outside their house, via communal access-points. But while the 
quality of water was not the main issue in that context, quantity of water was an important 
issue, with strong inequalities existing between non-connected households and households 
with private connections (Devoto et al. 2012). The aim of the ‘social connections’ program 
was to reduce inequalities in water quantity by facilitating individual household tap water 
connections through new financing options. The word ‘social’ refers to the fact that Amendis 
was targeting low-income population segments. Véolia-Amendis had to pre-finance the 
connections, with households paying the connection cost over time. Local authorities had 
fixed a cap for the loans: a maximum of around US$2,000 could be charged to the 
households (US$10 payment per month) to be repaid over multiple years (author interview 
with top manager, 2016). In this way, Amendis effectively provided water microloans (with 
longer repayment terms than MFIs) to households willing to pay the full commercial cost of a 
water connection.   
                                                 
5  The authors have repeatedly attempted to study the operation and impacts of WaterCredit, but Water.org has 
repeatedly denied access. 
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A randomised control trial (RCT) assessment conducted in 2010 to understand whether 
people would value individual water access enough to pay for it (despite no difference in 
water quality, as noted above, compared to the existing collective access points), showed 
that a significant proportion of households indeed was willing to pay extra money for home 
access (Devoto et al. 2012). This experiment was based on interest-free loans, more like a 
hire-purchase scheme. Yet problems came afterwards, when Amendis had to change the 
billing to include VAT and other costs, and started to charge higher tariffs, about which 
people complained and eventually organised resistance against, culminating in social 
protests in October 2015 in Tangier.6 While the RCT showed no impact was found on 
employment or any other kind of income-related measures, the financial burden people faced 
beyond the cost of water connection was not enumerated, leaving significant knowledge 
gaps around the financial impacts of the scheme on households. 
 
Moreover, it was found that the programme struggled to reach poor population segments. 
According to a top manager, while Tétouan was unsuccessful (and not included in the RCT), 
the repayment rates were high in Tangier but the program was not profitable, due to the 
heavy financial upfront investment and the cost of necessary administrative tasks such as 
dealing with missing property titles and organising house numbers on streets. Although the 
program highlighted the willingness of many low-income people to pay to improve their 
access to safe water, it also exposed serious implementation issues, and raised questions 
about low-income people’s ability to pay water bills in addition to servicing a loan for water. 
 
 
2 Key ingredients of water-microcredit 
arrangements 
In this section, we unravel and unpack the components such arrangements are made of. 
From a development policy perspective, the undeniable failure of many postcolonial 
governments at delivering key infrastructure and essential services to all citizens (roads, 
railroads, water, electricity, education, health care, sewage, telecoms, etc.) has led donors 
since the 1980s to emphasise a greater role for corporations and the private sector. Going 
beyond one-size-fits-all state-driven approaches, the hope is that entrepreneurs and firms 
will develop the best-suited solutions for specific contexts and populations, by pursuing 
business strategies that fight poverty, advance social inclusion, and deliver profits 
simultaneously. The post-2008 rediscovery by aid agencies of a growth imperative has 
further reinforced the pursuit finance-friendly approaches to poverty alleviation, nested in a 
complex and opaque yet decidedly business-oriented ‘beyond aid’ development agenda 
(Mawdsley 2018: 191). Consequently, many donors have increasingly insisted that business 
actors, including multinational corporations, be recognised ‘by multilateral development 
organizations and national governments, as part of the solution to global poverty alleviation’ 
(Schwittay 2011: S71). Simultaneously, business thinkers have forcefully argued that 
successful businesses should (and actually do) create not just shareholder value, but ‘shared 
value’ that accrues to businesses and society at large (Porter and Kramer 2006: 78). They 
have emphasised businesses can do more good by focusing on their core business activity, 
instead of pursuing auxiliary efforts such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
programmes. Specifically, the assertion that a ‘fortune at the bottom of the pyramid (BoP)’ 
(Prahalad and Hart 2002: 54) awaits businesses that recognise the poor (those living on less 
than US$2 a day, following Prahalad and Hart) ‘not as the needy but as potential consumers 
                                                 
6  Thousands of protestors chanted ‘Amedis go home, Tangier is not yours’, according to news reports; see 
www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-us-morocco-protests-idAFKCN0SQ1W920151101. 
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and a market’ (Elyachar 2012: 110) has informed a vision of poor people’s unmet needs as 
lucrative under-tapped market opportunities. 
 
The application of these logics to water has proceeded despite studies having shown that 
private providers had been no more efficient than state‐owned companies as regards 
access, service quality, operational efficiency, and tariff levels, and especially not in 
improving access for the poorest segments of the population (Jaglin and Zérah 2010; Bakker 
2010; Marin 2009). Corporations have also faced major difficulties tapping private capital 
markets to finance network modernisation and expansion. To clarify the imbrication of water-
microcredit arrangements with highly problematic aspects of the post-Washington 
Consensus inclusive development ideology and practice space, at the interface of states, 
markets and civil society, we highlight four key areas of practical activity or intellectual 
change which have conditioned the meeting of household water with microfinance. These 
are: ‘BoP’ and ‘social’ business approaches; inclusive markets and inclusive capitalism; 
entrepreneurial conceptions of low-income people’s agency; and an ethic of 
responsibilisation and behavioural change. 
 
2.1 BoP and social business models 
One of the most evocative expressions of the narrative of for-profit business holding the key 
to solving global poverty is the ‘fortune’ at the BoP prophesied by business guru CK 
Prahalad. While the opportunities for businesses opened up by Structural Adjustment in the 
1980s were often widely viewed as morally dubious and corporate incursions as unilaterally 
self-serving, since the late 1990s7 Prahalad and other BoP enthusiasts have offered an 
alternative narrative to morally validate and justify doing business with the global underclass, 
presenting this as a mutually beneficial arrangement across class divides.  
 
From a BoP perspective, people at the bottom of the global income hierarchy are not a social 
burden or victims. Instead, they are value-conscious consumers, capable of engaging in win-
win transactions with businesses, helping these to expand their markets and profits while 
themselves benefiting from a greater spectrum of choices, acquiring dignity and self-esteem 
through consumption, and sometimes also finding work as distributors and suppliers in 
corporate value chains. Businesses, in turn, should embrace the risks associated with doing 
business in ‘hostile environments’ (Elyachar 2012: 114) without the technical infrastructure 
and amenities they may be accustomed to (electricity, hygiene, roads, etc., possibly even 
institutional infrastructures such as law enforcement).  
 
If what international agencies consider to be unmet needs can really be transformed into 
unmet demand, the BoP market is potentially huge. An assessment of the size of the overall 
BoP market, stratified by population segments and different products and services, by the 
IFC suggested the global BoP population (people with living with less than US$3,000 a year) 
was 4 billion people, or a US$4.7 trillion potential market, within which water represents 
around US$20 billion (Hammond et al. 2007). For businesses to reach the BoP fortune, 
business strategists have suggested they must innovate value chains that ‘leverage the 4 A’s’ 
(Anderson and Billou 2007: 14): availability, reaching poor people regardless of their location; 
affordability, with prices accessible for even the poorest consumers; acceptability, 
acknowledging culture-specific repertoires to ensure the willingness of people to consume, 
distribute or sell the product or service; and awareness, finding suitable communication 
channels to inform consumers about the company’s value proposition.  
 
Yet notably absent from these suggestions (as well as from most conversations about BoP 
business models) are considerations about actual poverty impact. The BoP concept has 
consequently met critics who argue not only that the products sold might sometimes be 
                                                 
7  Prahalad and Hart (2002: 14) identify the year 1998 as when they first articulated the argument. 
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socially harmful – such as skin-whitening creams sold by multinationals in ‘fairness’-
obsessed India (Karnani 2007) – but also that their sale often depends on multi-level 
marketing schemes in which low-income people (generally using credit to buy their inventory) 
profit the least while taking the greatest risk (Dolan and Rajak 2016). Some supposedly 
innovative BoP business models also merely involve a repackaging of already-existing 
consumer products in smaller units sold at a higher per-unit prices, rather than real 
innovation or products with greater developmental potential (Kolk et al. 2014).  
 
A concept closely related to the BoP is ‘social business’. Where BoP advocates classically 
propose that large, existing (often multinational) firms can extend their value chains into 
poverty markets, social business – or ‘social enterprise’ – advocates propose an entirely new 
type of firm is emerging to serve BoP consumers’ needs. Promoted by Muhammad Yunus, 
since the late 2000s as the key to a ‘new kind of capitalism that serves humanity's most 
pressing needs’ (Yunus 2011), social businesses are seen as emerging from civil society as 
organisations that adopt business-based models of service delivery, aiming to generate 
profits which they reinvest and use to reach more poor people. According to Yunus and 
others (cf. Nicholls 2008), social businesses thus marry the efficiency of businesses with the 
pursuit of social goals; a ’double bottom-line’.  
 
For water provision, the social business concept proposes that new hybrid organisations can 
facilitate cost recovery from low-income users (a key concern for mainstream water 
policymakers) while still pursuing a social purpose, namely reaching more low-income people 
with water services. The BoP business proposition, as applied to water,8 suggests the 
problem is not that poor people cannot afford to pay market rates, but rather that the 
appropriate delivery mechanisms – infrastructural, organisational, financial – have not been 
found or used. BoP water business models not only look to offer BoP enthusiasts an 
opportunity to redeem their concept, but also an invitation for development actors to recast 
low-income people as value-conscious consumers of water who can be served by private 
enterprise. In this rendition, people’s likelihood of gaining access to water as BoP consumers 
depends on demonstrating their (supposed) ability and willingness to pay, thus enticing 
businesses to service them new ways of packaging, marketing, delivering, and financing 
water.  
 
2.2 Inclusive markets, inclusive capitalism 
Linked to BoP and social business visions, but operating at a more macro-political level, a 
panoply of ‘economic inclusion’ programmes and discourses has emerged over roughly the 
last decade, which focuses on expanding the opportunities available to actors in global 
markets, ensuring the participation of everyone and leaving no one behind (Weber 2017). 
Narratives of development as ‘inclusive growth’ (World Economic Forum 2017), ‘inclusive 
markets’ (Mendoza and Thelen 2008), ‘inclusive business’ (Jenkins and Ishikawa 2010), or 
‘inclusive capitalism’ (Hart 2012) not only articulate particular political visions and aspirations, 
but also invoke contemporary social justice vernacular to justify further market expansion and 
deepening. They suggest an alignment of the social inclusion agendas which have framed 
the post-2015 sustainable development goals (SDGs) with pro-business changes in the 
global political economy (or perhaps a capture of the former by the latter). The power of 
inclusion thinking can be seen, not least, in the emergence of financial inclusion as the new 
go-to term for what was once microfinance, which has successfully deflected criticisms of 
microfinance while expanding microfinance to accommodate a broader set of actors, 
including large financial corporations (Mader and Sabrow 2015).  
 
Although the proliferation of ‘inclusions’ evokes high-minded ideals of equality and justice – 
after all, who could argue for exclusion? –, market inclusion pursues a highly simplistic, 
                                                 
8  As well as other essential services, such as sanitation, electricity, health and education. 
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shallow notion of equality, namely equal opportunity to participate in market exchange. While 
advocates of ‘inclusive’ markets (or business, or capitalism) promulgate participation in 
market-oriented exchange as a great equaliser, questions about the unequal terms on which 
actors engage in exchange disappear from sight, as do questions of how markets exploit 
hierarchies and shape class conflicts (Selwyn 2016). Pointed critiques of market inclusion 
have been articulated by highlighting how unfavourable terms of exchange lead to ‘adverse 
incorporation’ in markets, which reproduces and generates new forms of inequality and 
difference (Hickey and Du Toit 2013: 134). As Meagher (2015: 837) notes, market inclusion 
and inclusive growth discourses thereby reframe ‘poverty and informality as a product of 
inadequate inclusion in markets, rather than a result of inequities in the way markets 
function.’    
 
The proposal that markets and capitalism should be rendered more inclusive reframes lack 
of access to safe water from failure of public bodies or market actors to adequately serve 
low-income people to an exclusion from (hypothetical) markets or capitalist relations of 
control over water. To illustrate: a 2013 Deloitte report adopted an ‘inclusive markets’ frame 
to assert that sanitation is a ‘private sector product that many can afford’ (Shah et al. 2013: 
11). Consequently, it argued that NGOs, microfinance institutions (MFIs), companies, and 
governments should actively deploy ‘market-making’ (ibid.: 22) strategies to overcome 
exclusion. However, poignantly, the report also revealed the highly unequal terms of the 
anticipated inclusion: all latrine options were the simplest possible designs, cheapened by 
modifications that would render their usable life-span significantly shorter than others 
(shallower pits) yet sold at an amplified price. Households would have to pay interest worth 
up to half the latrine’s value (in addition to, in many cases, still needing a government 
subsidy).9 
 
2.3 Entrepreneurialism 
With the consolidation of the neoliberal revolution in development theory and practice since 
the 1980s, a fundamental re-imagining of human agency has accompanied the broader 
repositioning of business and markets in development thinking. Poor people are increasingly 
understood as – either by their very nature, essentially; or by necessity, practically – agents 
who take charge of their own destinies through deliberate, gain-oriented and self-responsible 
economic choices. The figure of the poor entrepreneur as an ideal-typical bearer of individual 
agency has emerged from these developmental imaginaries in which ‘risk is a universal 
condition of existence’ (Szeman 2015: 475) and in which rights arising from citizenship are 
increasingly irrelevant. 
 
No longer a minor figure… the entrepreneur is abstracted and universalized into 
a model for all citizens (indeed, a model that may have the potential to replace 
the citizen as such)… It is a mechanism of selfhood and subject formation that 
begins from the premise that there is no one to count on, no one who can do 
anything for you other than yourself.  
(ibid.: 474, 484) 
 
Microcredit played an instrumental role in this figuration of the entrepreneur (and poor 
borrowers as good risks), with its uplifting stories of low-income people becoming 
empowered as entrepreneurs. Muhammad Yunus on numerous occasions has proclaimed 
‘all humans are born entrepreneurs’, and that poor people are ‘the world’s greatest 
entrepreneurs’.10 In a similar vein, the authors of Portfolios of the Poor, whose study of poor 
people’s money management as ‘portfolio management’ (Collins et al. 2009: 139) became a 
                                                 
9  The report proposes an interest rate of 24 per cent over a 1.5–2-year timeframe and a further 40–45 per cent 
government subsidy as instrumental for its suggested business model. 
10  Yunus Social Business Centre @ Becker College: http://yunuscentre.becker.edu/muhammad-yunus-quotes; Huffington 
Post: www.huffingtonpost.com/muhammad-yunus/global-business-summit_b_2070352.html. 
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cornerstone of the financial inclusion literature, evokes low-income people as shrewd 
financial agents who entrepreneurially grasp economic opportunities and hedge against 
risks.  
 
The entrepreneurial vision of agency features centrally in market-inclusive water thinking, not 
only with the hope for greater numbers of small-scale private operators to emerge, founded 
by poor entrepreneurs, but also with the expectation that water users will think 
entrepreneurially in terms of risks, rewards, and investment. In water-microcredit 
arrangements, an entrepreneurial disposition becomes a precondition for water access, as 
low-income consumers are expected to behave as if they were entrepreneurs, by recognising 
safe water as an economic opportunity to invest in. Users are expected to borrow, raising 
capital against anticipated future returns from a personal water investment, weigh it up 
against the risks of indebtedness or miscalculation, and garner financial returns (for instance, 
lower medical costs or higher labour market incomes). Moreover, they are expected to 
actively embrace these risks and opportunities, instead of making demands for systemic 
change and equity, such as fulfilment of a citizens’ right to water.  
 
2.4 Behavioural change and responsibilisation 
At the same time, it is obvious that not all low-income people are real entrepreneurs; at least 
not in the narrow sense of being capable of running profitable business ventures and driving 
innovation. But in the broader, abstracted sense, too, the world’s poor often act under a 
different calculus and set of rationales, and frequently disappoint policymakers and 
economist’s great expectations when they fail to self-responsibly embrace risks and grasp 
opportunities as predicted. Consequently, their ability to take the ‘correct’ developmental 
decisions for themselves has increasingly been drawn into question. Here too, microfinance 
played a role, albeit with its dénouement as an unsuccessful tool for self-development via 
microenterprise. A slew of RCTs since the late 2000s, which were expected to deliver 
conclusive evidence for ‘the miracle of microfinance’ (Banerjee et al. 2015: 22; Cull and 
Morduch 2017), returned very weak and partly negative findings about the impact of 
microloans on borrowers’ household economy (net assets, incomes, and consumption 
levels). But the RCTs also discovered that access to credit wrought small but significant 
behavioural changes, which policymakers seized upon as ‘tantalizing evidence that there 
could be important potential benefits for some poor households to be gained by helping the 
poor reprioritize their expenditures’ (Bauchet et al. 2011: 8). The changes that gained the 
most attention were around more responsible consumption and expenditure patterns, 
including reductions in nonessential expenditures and ‘temptation goods’ (Banerjee et al. 
2015: 24), and a slightly increased propensity to open up a business.  
 
These findings coincided with the accession of behavioural economics into the mainstream 
of the economics discipline, which treated the recognition that much of human agency 
deviated from rational actor models as a breakthrough insight.11 Translated into development 
and social policy, the new behaviourist orthodoxy holds that poor and low-income people 
often suffer from particular behavioural abnormalities. As the World Bank (2014) and others 
drawing on behavioural economics have argued, their judgments and choices are 
conditioned by mental shortcuts, social biases, and norms, not least due to cognitive 
‘bandwidth’ constraints imposed by poverty itself, which lead them to make less-than-optimal 
choices. They argue these constraints and misbehaviours could be overcome via 
interventions that lead to the ‘right’ choices (see Karlan and Appel 2012). Financial 
instruments – including savings, financial education, and microloans – play a key role in the 
new behaviourism, both for studying low-income people’s cognitive dispositions (via the data 
they generate) and as tools for re-shaping their ‘decision architectures’.  
 
                                                 
11  Not least with the awarding of the 2017 Swedish National Bank’s Prize in Economic Sciences to Richard Thaler. 
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Critics argue this amounts to behavioural engineering and a refocusing of poverty policy on 
individual responsibility (Berndt 2015). To Berndt (2015), behavioural economics approaches 
in development help shift the focus from fixing the problems of markets to fixing how market 
subjects work for markets. Following Li (2014), such attempts to ‘fix’ the behaviour of 
subjects with expert knowledge are not new, but rather are established techniques of liberal 
government since colonial times, with presumptions of a universal homo economicus merely 
being added in the neoliberal period. We would argue the ascendant behavioural agenda 
brings a gradual but potentially far-reaching change in governmental approach in relation to 
markets, via novel explanations of the relationship between markets and individuals. Poor 
individuals are regarded as failing to thrive because of, on the one hand, their lack of 
understanding markets and the opportunities they present, and on the other hand, markets 
failing to serve poor individuals due to misunderstanding their peculiar cognitive dispositions. 
The new behaviourism undergirds visions of progress being attained through inclusive 
markets, by offering explanations for past and present failures of market-oriented 
development not as failures of policy, but resulting from the misbehaviours and inadequacies 
of the market subjects themselves. Poor people find themselves with the responsibility to 
behave appropriately for the market to serve them, or else be responsible for their own 
poverty. Moreover, the new behaviourism offers policymakers and others new techniques for 
seeking to reshape individuals’ behaviours – nudges, etc. – and create the ‘correct’ 
outcomes, as if markets had the correct individuals at their disposal.  
 
Although, as we write, the behavioural agenda has only begun to show its emergence into 
the water inclusion space (cf. Dreibelbis et al. 2016; Neal et al. 2016) and water-microcredit 
arrangements specifically, water scholars should watch very closely for the ways in which it 
rejuvenates market-oriented approaches. Three reasons are salient. First, the new 
behaviourism delivers an extremely market-friendly explanation of why prior market-based 
water provision failed, namely due to failures of individuals, not of market-oriented policies. 
Second, it offers enthusiasts of BoP or inclusive markets approaches to water delivery a new 
roster of intrusive nudge techniques (often rolled out with, or through, financial tools) to push 
low-income people toward a greater cooperation with and uptake of market-oriented water 
arrangements. Third, it offers a potential defensive explanation if water access were to still 
remain elusive, as reflecting the misbehaviours and poor decisions of low-income people 
themselves; the market would not have failed to deliver water to low-income people, it would 
be the people who have failed to make the market work.  
 
 
3 Water-microcredit and the new inclusions: 
differential, conditional, individualised 
What the water-microcredit models reviewed in Section 2.4, despite their different practical 
approaches, have in common is the aim to make unmet needs for water into demand for 
water supplied by businesses, by expressing the need with (borrowed) money. In the 
BoP/social business and inclusive markets narrative, it is widely presumed that a strong 
unmet potential demand from low-income people for goods or services merely needs to be 
unlocked through innovative business models; in water-microcredit arrangements by using a 
loan to pay for water services. The underlying assumption is that the primary economic 
obstacle for potential users is not a lack of money with which to pay the full costs of services, 
but of financial liquidity, which can be removed through access to sources of finance.  
 
However, these promises of inclusion come at the expense of hopes for equity in water 
access. In these market-oriented, debt-led initiatives, water access depends on low-income 
people’s ability and willingness to access and use financial tools, and often even pay a 
higher price for a lower-quality service (relative to better-off users). This raises important 
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issues for water policy, as equity in water access and rights-based approaches are at risk of 
displacement by a morally and practically dubious ‘right to credit’. As we discuss here, the 
challenge that water-microcredit arrangements pose to progressive water policy is, in spite of 
their promises of inclusion, they render water access differential, conditional, and 
individualised. 
 
3.1 Inclusion with differentiation: different users, segmented services  
With the insertion of microcredit into already highly unequal, segmented, market-like water 
provision, what at first sight could appear as a step towards equalising access in fact invites 
new users to gain access only on vastly differential terms. With their focus on extending 
credit to households (rather than to the utility provider) water-microcredit arrangements often 
entail self-help or off-grid solutions, which often come at far higher unit costs compared to 
networked solutions – hence the WaterCredit loans of up to US$3,000 loans for private 
borewells. However, also where credit is used to gain access to existing water networks via a 
tap connection (which presupposes a network already existing), the cost for the new low-
income will be higher than for other users. A 20 per cent flat12 annual interest loan, repaid 
over 36 months in weekly instalments (the upper bands of WaterCredit’s models), entails 
paying 1.6 times more than a household that buys the connection outright. Considering, in 
addition, the relatively smaller amounts of water used by poorer households against the fixed 
cost of the tap connection, it is clear that lower-income water users pay much more per unit 
of service compared to middle-class users. At a purely financial level, this is differential 
inclusion, because the poor are charged more to be included, simply because they are poor. 
 
A closely related issue is the differentiation of water types, what we call segmented services. 
Field observations in Mexico, for instance, highlight how low-income populations have vastly 
different levels of service than higher-income users, and are forced to juggle and match 
different water sources at different prices to deal with different needs (e.g. drinking, cooking, 
cleaning, bathing). This segmentation is both a cause and consequence of water delivery 
through different water infrastructures operating in parallel. From a resource management 
perspective, allocating water optimally to different uses following price signals, as 
emphasised in the Dublin Principles, this may be efficient and desirable; but from a users’ 
perspective it is neither. Obtaining a portfolio of different waters from different sources 
including public sources, bottles, and small informal providers is a time-consuming, 
uncertain, and often physically demanding process. Moreover, water-microcredit 
arrangements are likely to exacerbate the segmentation, as loans support off-grid and self-
help solutions, sending much-needed (subsidised) capital flows toward end-users rather than 
water providers and leaving urgently-needed investments in tackling water quality problems 
unfunded.  
 
With this, water-microcredit arrangements appear a reflection of market inclusion 
programmes more broadly. They produce and re-produce multivalent inequalities and 
differences within the market frame. Research on the financial inclusion of poor populations 
has shown that beyond economic or technical barriers, factors such as social discrimination 
along socioeconomic status, gender and ethnicity lines affect the inclusivity patterns of 
markets (Johnson 2005; Guérin et al. 2012). Some population segments may be excluded on 
the supply side by selective network expansion or segmented water provision along racial 
lines (Kjellen and McGranahan 2006: 2; Bakker 2010: 66, 99). But we need to also take 
social regulation into account, as personal relations, social norms and identities circumscribe 
or expedite accession to the marketplace. With water-microfinance, ‘inclusive’ water access 
becomes inclusion on a differentiated and segmented pattern. Differences are demarcated 
along socio-economic and other status lines (different users) as well as along segments of 
water (different usages, different levels of safety). Lower-income people already pay the 
                                                 
12  Flat, not declining, interest is common in microfinance. 
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highest price for water of more dubious quality, above all in terms of health impacts, and 
women usually the highest price in terms of labour to obtain water. The continuing 
differentiation and segmentation of water will further impose the costs disproportionately on 
those who are already most disadvantaged.  
 
3.2 Inclusion with conditionality: metered access, via credit 
With water-microcredit arrangements, we also find water inclusion being premised upon 
water users meeting extra conditions. Water access is made conditional upon willingness 
and ability to pay and therefore willingness and ability to take a loan, via the use of financial 
services; in defiance, not least, of the unconditional human right to water enshrined in 2003 
in international law, and adopted by the United Nations in 2010.13 Moreover, the contested 
issue of metering reappears – in some senses literally, with low-income users using credit to 
pay for metered connections – but also metaphorically, with water-microcredit enacting the 
principle that each person gets only what they pay for. Changes to social provision systems 
in the post-Structural Adjustment development space, especially conditional cash transfers 
(CCTs), have fostered a withdrawal of the state from service provision (Lavinas 2017), and 
have made social provision increasingly conditional on recipients exhibiting ‘“responsible” 
individual behavior’ (Ruckert 2010: 825). States have increasingly established a ‘social 
reproduction regime in which social inclusion is conditional upon the performance of 
beneficiaries’ (Ruckert 2010: 831).  
 
While in Ruckert’s analysis conditionality emanates from the conditions attached to 
international financial institutions’ (IFIs) loans to developing country governments, which 
require cost-saving on social welfare, we find the conditional inclusion logic also to extend to 
the broader market provision logic. Simply put, in market inclusion, BoP, and social business-
type approaches (which are often deployed by NGOs, not IFIs), people only get what they 
pay for, and non-payers must be cut off – from water, other services, and access to financial 
resources. Water-microcredit arrangements offer conditional inclusion in goods and services 
that are essential to everyday life and social reproduction, conditional on good behaviour. 
Importantly, these approaches introduce new cost recovery channels for water that hinge on 
the conditionality built into financial contracts, outsourcing the enforcement of payment for 
water (in models like WaterCredit) to third parties, such as banks, MFIs, or specialised 
NGOs. These actors appear to command superior payment enforcement mechanisms, 
compared to water providers, and – where users fail to perform correctly – also are more 
ably poised to deploy the tools of behaviour change, ‘using nudges and choice architecture 
to encourage more desirable social outcomes’ (Klein 2017: 492). 
 
While Ruckert’s argument that social inclusion is increasingly ‘conditional upon the 
performance of beneficiaries’, few studies have yet connected debt burdens with a lack of 
infrastructure and how people cope with basic service-related costs (for water, sanitation, 
gas and electricity). In that context, the conditions attached via retail loans to poor people’s 
participation in BoP or inclusive markets-type approaches, may represent an additional debt 
burden, as existing evidence demonstrates that a large important proportion of microfinance 
clients are already over-indebted, even if they keep repaying (Guérin et al. 2013). New debts 
that are taken on for access to basic services are liable to increase financial distress.  
 
3.3 Individual behaviour and responsibility: marketisation and depoliticisation 
Finally, with water-microcredit arrangements, we also note an ethic of individual 
responsibilisation and behavioural change gaining centrality in water provision. Water 
becomes an individual issue; individuals are responsible for their own actions and inclusion. 
                                                 
13  The UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) ‘General Comment No. 15’ articulated this right, specifying that 
water facilities and services must be affordable and accessible to all, regardless of ability to pay , although the power 
and usefulness of this right have been overestimated and strongly criticised. 
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Individuals’ failures to behave appropriately – for instance, ‘failing’ to entrepreneurially invest 
extra time in generating extra income – will have knock-on effects, above all the risk of being 
unable to repay the loan, leaving households in exacerbated poverty, and leading to 
subsequent exclusion from other services. No redistribution from rich to poor is considered 
(let alone compensation for past water injustices); rather, low-income people are offered an 
opportunity to purchase water by indebting themselves (and a responsibility to do so) and 
paying the better-off for extending them a loan. Should they fail to grasp this offer, or to gain 
enough benefits, this would reflect their own irresponsibility, misbehaviour, or lack of 
entrepreneurial ethic. 
 
Behaviour-change interventions have held sway in water and sanitation at least since the 
emergence of Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) programmes, which some argue are 
now practically ‘hegemonic in donor-supported rural sanitation’ in parts of the world 
(Bateman and Engel 2018: 155). CLTS programmes can use shame and community self-
policing to foster a departure from subsidy-driven programming (Cavill et al. 2015). But 
where CLTS interventions aim to instigate behaviour changes through community self-help 
activities – and may tacitly exploit existing class, caste, status and political formations in the 
process (Bateman and Engel 2018) –, water-microcredit arrangements signal a shift toward 
behavioural change interventions that target individuals. In this, they are aligned with 
contemporary nudge theory, and seek to mobilise market-ready forms of agency amongst 
the poor (Berndt 2015; Leggett 2014). While already often under financial duress, low-
income people, who suffering most from the existing inequities around water access, are 
obliged to play along with the commodification of essential goods and services; and pay the 
full costs of better services. Their responsibility is to express their social reproduction needs 
as market opportunities for water and financial service providers, and to act entrepreneurially 
to make their demand effective by finding ways to earn money and pay for water and credit. 
No wonder that, as highlighted above, increasingly intrusive behavioural interventions are 
directed at poor and low-income people. Our concern is that behavioural-change agendas 
will rise to the fore when low-income households fail to perform their intended roles of being 
compliant borrowers or borrowing at all, for water. Water scholars and practitioners may take 
heed, and be prepared to critically confront the modalities and consequences of nudges and 
other individualised behaviour-modification tools as they proceed to enter into the water and 
sanitation space (see Dreibelbis et al. 2016 and Neal et al. 2016 on nudging for sanitation 
and handwashing behavioural change).  
 
Where, in the 1990s, many governments came under pressure to treat water as a private 
good, or otherwise lose desperately-needed lines of credit, their citizens now find themselves 
under similar pressures. But, as stressed by Guérin et al. (2013: 2), debt is already a fact of 
everyday life for the poor, and ‘the rising debt burden has to be placed into a broader context 
of sometimes stagnant or declining household incomes’. Precarious livelihoods, inexistent or 
weak social protection, and growing consumption needs (not only among the middle classes 
but also lower income brackets) are the social context in which water-microcredit 
arrangements are being deployed.  
 
 
4 Conclusion 
Above, we illustrated how the enmeshment of water with microcredit shifts debts and 
responsibilities for water onto users, and thus poses an acute challenge to more equitable 
water provision arrangements. While water-microcredit models may perhaps be evaluated 
more broadly as yet another dimension of the financialisation of social reproduction and of 
poverty itself (Fine 2010; Mader 2015), more narrowly they advance a creeping erosion of 
the social contract around water. Promises of inclusion no longer come from national 
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governments and local bodies, and instead come from transnational bottling companies, 
large corporate foundations, specialised NGO, and finance companies.  
 
In ‘inclusive’ markets for water and sanitation, low-income populations, constructed as 
consumers rather than citizens, encounter increasingly segmented (not equal) services, find 
access to services being conditional on responsible individual behaviour (rather than 
equitably delivered based on rights), and experience increasingly differential (not equalising) 
treatments. These features, which are particularly salient in water-microcredit arrangements, 
extend across the water space wherever ‘inclusive markets’ are proposed as solutions, and 
will be exacerbated with new behaviourist approaches infiltrating the wider ‘post-market’ 
development space (Klein 2017). Concerningly, the conditionality of inclusive markets, 
premised on payment-for-service logics and self-responsible, entrepreneurially-oriented 
individual agency, undermines the notion of unconditional human rights – enshrined, in the 
case of water, in the Human Right to Water. When market inclusion based on credit replaces 
rights and equity-oriented logics of access, hard-won entitlements to a minimum standard of 
provision for human survival and dignity are watered-down (as it were) to be mere rights to 
access the market. The risk is that social and economic rights atrophy further, and come to 
resemble the deeply illogical ‘human right to credit’ propagated by Muhammad Yunus.   
 
Far from overcoming the failures of the neoliberal development order, the ostensible re-
embedding of social questions into market-oriented development agendas (inclusive 
markets, BoP, social business, etc.) entrenches market logics in water provision in the post-
neoliberal policy space. As Weber points out with regard to the SDG agenda, contemporary 
inclusive development practices are ‘premised on the consolidation of the conditions of the 
‘market episteme’ while attempting to mitigate against any challenges to this political project’ 
(Weber 2017: 410). Water-microcredit arrangements offer an avenue for water privatisation 
by privatising the water access question as an individual/household choice and responsibility. 
In this, they avoid the broader, more politicised question of resource ownership and system 
governance, while enabling water privatisation ‘through the back door’ (Mader 2011: 7). In 
light of the political and practical failure of earlier privatisations and attempts at full cost 
recovery, water-microcredit arrangements help pursue these objectives while clearly paying 
greater ‘attention to the political economy of moving from here to there’ (World Bank 2004: 
16). Rather than being led by corporations, the post-neoliberal privatisation of water access 
by NGOs and MFIs – often funded by corporations and corporate philanthropy – has thus far 
effectively evaded political contestation.  
 
Taking a wide view, we urge scholars and policymakers to analytically transcend the false 
binary built into discourses of inclusion and exclusion with respect to markets. Instead of 
(mis-)understanding socioeconomic iniquities as reflecting market exclusion – as with 
insinuations that low-income people’s lack of safe water is a case of exclusion from 
(hypothetical) water markets –, scholars and practitioners of development should clearly 
recognise inclusive markets themselves as increasingly significant sites for the production 
and reproduction of inequalities. Economic inclusion into capitalist markets, especially when 
premised on debt for basic needs, perverts the idea of inclusion, by celebrating inequalities 
of outcome under the guise of equal access.  
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